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Section 1: Introduction 
It has been nearly six months since Ireland introduced restrictions to help prevent the spread of Covid-
19. For Ireland, Covid-19 poses the single largest challenge to the economy since the financial crisis 
with potentially an even larger impact. The highly contagious nature of the disease has meant that the 
stringency of the containment measures imposed have been unprecedented in nature and scale. 
Economy activity in some sectors in Ireland completely ceased for a significant period of time, while the 
labour market was transformed from one of full employment in late-2019 to one in which an 
unemployment rate of 29 per cent was recorded in April. Though economic activity has returned as 
restrictions have been gradually eased, it is likely that this will remain below its pre-pandemic level for 
some time to come.  
 
Alongside dealing with the largest economic downturn in recent history, Ireland also faces the prospect 
of the UK leaving the current transition period with the EU on the 1st January 2021 without a free trade 
agreement being reached. The UK has turned down an extension to the transition period and will leave 
the EU at the end of 2020. Irrespective of the final form of Brexit, it will have a negative impact on the 
Irish economy. Many studies have estimated the potential long run negative impact on the Irish 
economy (Bergin et al., 2019; Arriola et al., 2018; Central Bank of Ireland, 2019). However, these 
studies attempted to examine the question of the long-run impact of Brexit on the Irish economy based 
on a pre-pandemic world and were based on a backdrop of strong economic performance. 
 
As both Covid-19 and Brexit represent significant economic shocks to the Irish economy, an inevitable 
question arises regarding the interrelationship of the two shocks. For example, do the two shocks 
exacerbate each other or could the impact of Brexit be less if activity has already been reduced? It is 
this question that this paper attempts to address. De Lyon and Dhingra (2020a, 2020b) recently 
attempted to address this question for the UK by comparing the sectors that have been most affected 
by Covid-19 with those affected by Brexit. Across a range of indicators, they find that the sectors that 
have been impacted by Covid-19 are generally different to the sectors are likely to be affected by Brexit.  
In this paper, we follow a similar approach to De Lyon & Dhingra (2020a, 2020b) and compare the 
sectors that have been most affected by Covid-19 with those most likely to be affected by Brexit. To 
examine the sectoral impact of Covid-19, we make use of data on the number of recipients of pandemic 
income support from the State in the form of the Pandemic Unemployment Payment (PUP) and the 
Temporary Wage Subsidy Scheme (TWSS). In terms of the Brexit sectoral impact, we update the 
analysis in Lawless and Morgenroth (2019) for goods trade and the services trade analysis of Lawless 
(2018).  For the impact of Brexit on goods trade, the update uses the most recent product-level data 
from UN Comtrade and matches this to the UK’s announced tariff schedule from January 2021. This 
tariff schedule was published in May 2020.1 We then formally compare the sectoral impacts of the two 
shocks and examine potential domestic supply chain connections between sectors that are likely to be 






Overall, we find that there is limited overlap in the sectors exposed to the different shocks. The most 
severely impacted sectors from Covid-19, such as hospitality and construction are expected to have 
almost no impact from Brexit. The most exposed sector to the Brexit shock, financial services and 
insurance, has not been unaffected by Covid-19, but is in the mid-range of the Covid-19 impacts. More 
formally estimating a correlation coefficient between the two shocks finds no statistically significant 
evidence of overlap. This finding also holds when we examine the flow of goods and services between 
sectors affected by the two shocks. We find that sectors that are severely affected by Covid-19 typically 
sell a greater share of their output for use as inputs in the production process to sectors that are likely 
to be relatively unaffected by Brexit and vice versa. This implies relatively limited exposure of producers 
to their customers experiencing one of the shocks while they experience the other shock. There is 
evidence of more connections between sectors in the form of buyers in relatively unexposed sectors 
purchasing from suppliers in sectors that are severely impacted by either the Brexit or Covid-19 shock. 
This could result in transmission of the shocks to the less directly exposed sectors either through prices 
or supply restrictions. Overall, these findings suggest that adding the Brexit shock to that of Covid-19 
brings a wider range of sectors exposed to risk but that the impacts do not appear to be subject to 
interaction effects.  
Business perceptions suggest a somewhat greater degree of overlap: a CSO survey on the Business 
Impact of Covid-19 in July 2020 found that just over twenty per cent of firms expected both that they 
would be negatively affected by Brexit and that the Covid-19 pandemic would make this impact worse 
than previously anticipated. A further fifteen per cent of firms that expected to be impacted by Brexit did 
not anticipate any change to the Brexit effect from having to deal with Covid-19 while a smaller group 
of just under eight per cent of firms expected that Brexit would now have less of an impact. This makes 
up the 43 per cent of firms reporting exposure to Brexit while the remainder did not feel Brexit was a 
risk to their business.2  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines the sectoral level impact of Covid-
19. Section 3 estimates sectoral level impacts of Brexit. Section 4 compares the sectoral impacts of the 
two shocks. In section 5 we make use of Input-Output tables to examine the potential supply chain 












Section 2: The Sectoral Effects of Covid-19 
The policy response to the spread of the Covid-19 virus both domestically and internationally, while 
necessary from a public health perspective, has resulted in a sharp contraction in global and domestic 
economic activity, with the size and speed of impact unprecedented in modern times. The initial 
containment measures put in place to restrict the spread of the virus has meant that economic activity 
in many sectors of the economy was significantly reduced. The OECD (2020) estimated that 21 per 
cent of Irish economic activity (in GDP terms) takes place in sectors most likely to be directly affected 
by the containment measures introduced. However, this figure is affected by globalisation-related 
issues, which inflate Ireland’s GDP and have limited impact on Irish living standards.  The share 
increases to 32 per cent when expressed as a percentage of modified GNI and to almost 37 per cent 
when expressed as a percentage of ‘domestic’ gross valued added (Department of Finance, 2020). 
At this stage it is clear that there is a significant degree of heterogeneity across sectors with regard to 
the impact of Covid-19. Activity in the services sector has been significantly reduced in recent months 
and may continue to be reduced in the months to come to accommodate social distancing and additional 
hygiene requirements. For example, activity in the distribution, transport, hotels and restaurants sector 
has experienced a significant decline. Hotels and restaurants were effectively closed since mid-March 
and only reopened upon the beginning of Phase 3 of the Government’s Roadmap for Reopening Society 
and Business on 29th June. Many forms of travel including by air have been reduced significantly. Many 
non-food retailers were closed for several months and only reopened with the onset of Phase 2 on 8th 
June. Activity in the arts and entertainment sector effectively stopped for four months and only resumed 
with the onset of Phase 3 on the 29th June which allowed for the reopening of museums, galleries, 
theatres and cinemas etc. It is likely that other services sectors such as administration and support 
activities, which includes rental/leasing activities and travel agency, and real estate activities will also 
be significantly reduced. That being said, finance and insurance activities and information and 
communication technology are likely to be the least affected service sectors primarily on the basis that 
they rely less on direct contact between consumers and service providers while the activity in those 
sectors should be able to be completed from home. Likewise, activity in the government sector should 
be minimally affected.  
This differing impact amongst services sectors is further outlined in Figure 1 below which presents the 
value of monthly services index rebased so that February 2020 is equal to 100. This chart shows that 
amongst the service sectors, accommodation and food services, other service activities and 
transportation and storage are the most impacted sectors. In contrast, some services sectors including 










Figure 1: Sectoral Impacts of Covid-19, February 2020=100 
   
Source: CSO Monthly Services Index, CSO Industrial Production and Turnover 
 
The direct impact of Covid-19 on manufacturing sectors is likely to be smaller than that of services 
sectors. This is primarily on the basis that many manufacturing industries were regarded as ‘essential’ 
when restrictions were first put in place. Output in manufacturing is expected to grow this year primarily 
due to the performance of the pharmaceutical and chemical products sectors which dominate the 
manufacturing sector in Ireland, accounting for the majority of industrial production in 2019 (CSO, 2020). 
Production in this ‘modern’ sector, which comprises a number of high-tech pharmaceutical sectors, has 
been relatively unaffected by Covid-19 (Figure 1). However, production in the mainly indigenous sector 
has been adversely affected with manufacturing production volumes in the traditional sector only 
returning to its pre-Covid level by the end of July (Figure 1).The traditional sector has a higher domestic 
value-added and is more labour intensive than the modern sector of the economy. It is also less affected 
by contract manufacturing, thus providing a more accurate assessment of domestic economy activity 
in industry.  
The economic impact of Covid-19 is perhaps best seen through the prism of the labour market.3 The 
outbreak of Covid-19 and the measures introduced to reduce the spread of the virus resulted in an 
unprecedented unemployment rate of 29 per cent being recorded in April if all claimants of the 
 



















































































































Pandemic Unemployment Payment were classified as unemployed, as shown in Figure 2. Though the 
unemployment rate has fallen since April, many workers have not yet returned to employment as the 
Covid-19 restrictions have been lifted with a Covid-19 adjusted unemployment rate of 15.4 per cent 
recorded in August.  
 
Figure 2: Monthly Unemployment Rate, % labour force 
 
Source: CSO  
Note: This series includes the seasonally adjusted monthly unemployment rate from July 1998 to February 2020. 
From March 2020 onwards we use the CSO’s Covid-19 adjusted monthly unemployment rate which includes 
recipients of the Pandemic Unemployment Payment (PUP).  
As of 7th September 2020, approximately 220,000 people are currently unable to work as a result of 
the pandemic and are in receipt of the Pandemic Unemployment Payment (PUP).4 These individuals 
are eligible to receive this payment if they have lost their job on or after 13th March due to the pandemic.5 
Though this number is 63 per cent below the peak as of 5th May (602,000), the pace of reduction in the 
numbers claiming the PUP has begun to slow in recent weeks.6 A further 360,000 employees, remain 
linked to their employer and are currently being supported by the Temporary Wage Subsidy Scheme 
(TWSS) payment administered by the Revenue Commissioners7, having received a subsidy in their 
most recent pay period as of 3rd September.8 At present, therefore, there are approximately 580,000 
people receiving some form of pandemic related income support from the state.  
 
4 See Byrne et al. (2020) for an overview of the initial labour market impact of Covid-19.  
5 The PUP was initially set at €203 per week before being increased to €350 per week after the first week. From 
the 29th June, the rate of payment changed again. The rate of payment is currently based on earnings from previous 
employment; if you earned less that €200 a week, your payment is €203 per week and if you earned €200 or more 
a week the payment remains at €350. Furthermore, the PUP has been extended to 21st April 2021 with further rate 
changes due on 17th September 2020, 1st February 2021 and 1st April 2021.  
6 See figure A1 and A2 in the annex. 
7 The Employment Wage Subsidy Scheme (EWSS) replaced the Temporary Wage Subsidy Scheme from 1st 
September, and it will run to 31st March 2021. Under the EWSS scheme, employers and new firms in sectors 
impacted by Covid-19 whose turnover has fallen by at least 30 per cent will receive a flat rate subsidy per week 
based on the number of qualifying employees on the payroll, including seasonal staff and new employees. 
8 The TWSS statistics presented in this paper are the CSO’s estimate of those who are ‘currently’ being supported 













































































































































































To examine the sectoral impact of Covid-19, Figure 3 presents the most exposed sectors in terms of 
the share of the total number of people receiving either the PUP or the TWSS at the peak, namely the 
week ending the first week in May.9 In particular, each area in the chart represents the sectoral share 
of the total number receiving either the PUP or TWSS where bigger sectoral shares correspond to 
bigger areas in the chart. At the peak in the start of May, just over 1 million people were in receipt of 
either the PUP or the TWSS. The sectors most exposed to the Covid-19 shock, in terms of the number 
of people receiving either the PUP or TWSS, were Wholesale and Retail Trade (196k) representing 
almost one-fifth of all income support recipients, Accommodation and Food Services (161k) 
representing 16 per cent of all income support recipients, Construction (119k) representing 12 per cent 
of all income support recipients and Industry (98k) representing 10 per cent of all income support 
recipients. 
 
Figure 3: Recipients of Pandemic Income Support by Sector, % of total at peak 
 
Source: Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection (DEASP), CSO 
 
As of the end of the first week in May, more than forty per cent of all those employed in Q4 2019 were 
receiving income support through either the PUP or TWSS (Table 1). The worst affected sectors in 
terms of the share of sectoral employment receiving income support, were Accommodation and Food 
Services (90 per cent), Construction (81 per cent), Administrative and Support Services (65 per cent). 
Wholesale and Retail Trade (63 per cent), Arts, Entertainment and Other Services (61 per cent), 
 
9 Due to timing issues regarding the publication of pandemic income support data, the first week in May is a 
combination of those receiving the PUP to the week ending 5th May and those who were ‘currently’ being supported 




Transportation and Storage (45 per cent), Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities (44 per cent) 
and Industry (34 per cent).10 












(1+2) as % 
of All 
Recipients 





Wholesale and Retail 
Trade 
91 105 196 19 63 
Accommodation and Food 
Services 
129 32 161 16 90 
Construction 80 40 119 12 81 
Industry 40 58 98 10 34 
Administrative and 
Support Service Activities 
46 27 73 7 65 
Arts, Entertainment and 
Other Services 
54 18 71 7 60 
Professional, Scientific 
and Technical Activities 
25 37 62 6 44 
Transportation and 
Storage 
18 30 48 5 45 
Human Health and Social 
Work Activities 
23 25 48 5 16 
Financial Insurance and 
Real Estate Activities 
21 16 36 4 32 
Education 22 10 33 3 17 
Information and 
Communication 
12 14 26 3 21 
Public Administration and 
Defence, Compulsory 
Social Security 
15 0.4 15 1 13 
Agriculture 9 3 12 1 11 
Total 602 425 1,027 100 44 
Source: DEASP, CSO 
Note: Figures may not sum due to rounding. The sectoral employment data is taken from the CSO’s Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) data for 2019Q4. The PUP is measured as 18-66 while the LFS employment data is 15+ so shares 
presented are not exact but rather are approximate. We use the PUP sectoral breakdown from DEASP. For the 
TWSS in the week up to 3rd May approximately 9,000 people were not assigned to a sector while for the PUP 
19,000 were not assigned to a sector. 
 
In terms of the sectoral analysis, we rank Wholesale and Retail Trade, Construction, Transportation 
and Storage, Accommodation and Food Services, Real Estate, Travel Agency and tourism service 
activities as ‘severely affected’ by Covid-19. As it is currently not possible to get disaggregated 
 
10 As a robustness check we also examine the sectoral labour market impacts if we use the PUP data published 
by CSO presented in Table A1 in the annex. In general, the ranking of most vulnerable sectors (PUP + TWSS 
recipients as % of 2019Q4 sectoral employment) is the same across data sources although the absolute magnitude 




pandemic income support data on subsectors within Industry, we make the assumption that sectors 
included in the traditional or indigenous industry are likely to be ‘moderately affected’ by Covid-19 while 
those in the high-tech pharmaceutical and chemicals sector are likely to be relatively unaffected by 
Covid-19. Land Transport, Warehousing and certain aspects of Administration and Support Services 
are also likely to be moderately affected. In terms of those sectors which are viewed as relatively 
unaffected we include Agriculture, the Manufacture of Food and Beverages, the Provision of Water 
Supply, Sewerage, Waste Management and Remediation Activities, Information and Communication 
Activities, Financial and Insurance Activities, Public Administration Health and Education, and the 
majority of Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities.  
 
Section 3: The Sectoral Effects of Brexit 
To estimate the effect of Brexit across sectors, we update and re-estimate the results from two previous 
pieces of research, Lawless and Morgenroth (2019) for goods trade and Lawless (2018) for services. It 
is necessary to estimate the impacts for goods and services separately due to differences in data 
collection and in the methodology applied to estimate how changes in the trading landscape would 
affect the two types of trade flow in the event of no trade deal being concluded between the EU and UK 
by the end of the transition period.  
 
The methodology for goods trade is to match published tariff rates to current product level trade data 
and estimate the effect this would have on demand if the entire tariff was passed into prices.  The results 
in Lawless and Morgenroth (2019) emphasised the variation in external tariffs applied by the EU and 
how this resulted in quite different trade impacts of Brexit across EU member states and across different 
sectors within each country.  Due to a combination of closer trade links with the UK and a relatively high 
share of agri-food exports where tariffs tend to be highest, Ireland was found to be the most exposed 
to trade effects of Brexit of all of the remaining EU members. 
 
When the previous analysis was carried out, there was no information available on the tariff rates that 
the UK might apply to countries that it had no free trade agreement with and the results were therefore 
based on an assumption that the UK would mirror the tariff schedule that the EU had registered with 
the WTO.  In May 2020, the UK government announced a new tariff schedule that would apply to imports 
from countries that the UK had no trade agreement with, including the EU if no agreement is reached 
by the end of the year.11 This paper therefore updates the previous research by applying this new 
information on UK tariffs to more recent detailed trade flow data from 2018.  
The UK Global Tariff is broadly similar in structure to the EU’s WTO tariffs with typically higher tariffs 
applying to agri-food products and lower tariffs on manufactured goods. Compared to the EU tariffs, 
around half of product lines have lower tariffs that are to be applied and these products account for 
around 31 per cent of Irish exports to the UK. The products with tariff reductions fall almost evenly into 
two groups. The first group of products with lower tariffs are described in the official documentation as 






are products where tariffs have been entirely abolished. The number of products with zero tariffs under 
the UK schedule is around 25 per cent higher than that of the EU tariff schedule. In terms of impact on 
trade, however, this liberalisation is less dramatic than might be expected as the majority of tariffs in 
this second group were already very low with few exceeding 2 per cent. We repeat the same 
methodology used by Lawless and Morgenroth (2019) using the new UK Global Tariff rates applied to 
current levels of Irish-UK trade. An assumption is made that the full tariff amount would be incorporated 
into the price, and we use sector level elasticity estimates calculated by Imbs and Mejean (2016) to 
estimate what this tariff-induced price increase would do to trade values across products. 
The top panel of Table 2 present the results aggregated to broad groups of sectors along with the 
pattern of trade across these groups. The UK overall accounts for approximately ten per cent of Irish 
goods exports although it is more important as an export destination for domestically-owned firms 
(Lawless, Siedschlag and Studnicka, 2017). Around 30 per cent of exports to the UK are in the food 
and beverages sector where tariffs are systematically higher than on other goods and, as a result, the 
estimated reduction in exports for this group is higher at 75 per cent than the overall reduction of 34 per 
cent.  
 
The second panel of Table 2 recalculates the estimated effects on services trade as in Lawless (2018) 
in order to align the subsectors in the services data (which is reported using Balance of Payments (BOP) 
categories) with the sectors in the employment data. This is necessary in order to be able to make a 
comparison of the Brexit and Covid-19 shocks on a comparable basis. However, this does come with a 
caveat that the aggregation and matching are based on an assumption that all of a particular services 
category is exported by the most closely related employment sector which is slightly simplistic. As there 
is no comparable fall-back position for services trade that external tariffs provide for goods, the 
methodology applied here is different. A gravity model approach is used, which is a standard method 
of estimating the determinants of trade flows between countries based on fundamental factors such as 
the size of their markets and the cost of moving goods between them (Head and Mayer, 2014). These 
costs can be direct transport costs (often proxied by distance between the countries) and a wide range 
of other characteristics of the country or product that can facilitate or inhibit trade. Here our main interest 
is in how EU membership has affected trade costs in services. A number of other factors are also 
controlled for including common language, sharing a land border and a colonial relationship in addition 
to the size of the market (GDP) and its income level (GDP per capita).  
The key focus on the degree to which the European Union has facilitated trade in services amongst its 
members compared to trade between other partner countries. To estimate the effect of Brexit, we 
assume that any statistically significant impact of EU membership on services trade flows is removed 
and these are reported below. Trade in financial services is found to have benefited most from the EU’s 
single market and, as such, is the most at risk of reductions in trade following Brexit. This is followed by 
information and communication services. The overall impact of Brexit on services exports from Ireland 
to the UK in the absence of a trade deal is estimated to be somewhat larger than the effect on goods 
with a reduction of 43 per cent estimated. This is equivalent to a fall of 6 per cent in total Irish services 
exports. Compared to the previous results in Lawless (2018), the effects on exports to the UK are very 




been estimated as being 9 per cent and is now 6 per cent, which is due to a fall in the share of overall 
services exports destined for the UK since the 2014 data that was used in the previous work.   
 
Table 2: Structure of Irish Exports to UK and Estimated Effects of Brexit 
 Exports to UK (€m) Export Change 
Goods   
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 341 20% 
Food Products, Beverages and Tobacco 4,706 75% 
Traditional 3,347 21% 
Modern 6,180 10% 
Miscellaneous 1,196 41% 
Total Goods Exports to UK 15,771 34% 
Irish Total Goods Exports 152,521 4% 
UK Share of Goods Exports 10%  
   
Services   
Administrative and support services 728 39% 
Financial, insurance and real estate 8,212 62% 
Information and communication 8,831 43% 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 412 31% 
Transportation and storage 3,552 13% 
Accommodation and food services        1,008               0% 
Other services               5,540               0% 
Total Services Exports to UK      28,282             43% 
Irish Total Services Exports     180,077                6% 
UK share of Services Exports               16%  
Source: Goods export data from United Nations ComTrade, tariffs from UK Government and elasticities from Imbs 
and Mejean (2016). Services export data from CSO. 
Note: Goods data aggregated from HS6 product-level and services data aggregated from BOP categories for 
comparison with employment data across NACE sectors. Services aggregation assumes all services in a BOP 















Section 4: Comparison of Sector Impacts 
The previous sections examined the available information on the sectoral impacts of Covid-19 and 
Brexit separately. The key question of this paper is the extent to which these impacts are correlated 
across sectors. We compare the impacts across sectors in a number of ways: We first use output 
reductions from the sectoral breakdowns described previously to calculate how closely these are 
correlated. We then use a finer level of sectoral detail to broaden the analysis building on the evidence 
from the previous sections and assign a rank to each sector across both shocks according to their 
expected vulnerability. Three categories are used: severely affected sectors (“Red”), moderately 
affected sectors (“Amber”) and unaffected sectors (“Green”). It should be noted that this characterisation 
is at a broad sector level and does not preclude exposure to the shocks that differs at an individual firm 
level. In this section, we do a simple comparison of the level of overlap in rankings across the sectors. 
Section 5 then uses these rankings to further investigate the interactions between the sectors through 
supply chain channels.  
 
Figure 4 compares the impacts of the Covid-19 and Brexit shocks from the two previous sections. Both 
shocks are converted to an output fall for comparability, assuming that with a constant output per worker 
that the reduction in employment used to measure the Covid-19 shock is equivalent to the same 
percentage reduction in output for each sector. This may slightly underestimate the impact if productivity 
itself is impacted by the shock – in the case of Covid-19, for example, output per worker could be lower 
as new requirements for social distancing and greater hygiene may slow down some business 
processes. However, no evidence is yet available for the size of this effect or how sustained it may be 
so we cannot directly incorporate it into this assessment. For the Brexit shock, output is assumed to 
reduce by the amount of lost exports. This simple comparison suggests fairly limited overlap in the 
sectors exposed to the different shocks. The most severely impacted sectors from Covid-19, such as 
hospitality and construction are expected to have almost no impact from Brexit. The most exposed 
sector to the Brexit shock, financial services and insurance, has not been unaffected by Covid-19, but 
is in the mid-range of the Covid-19 impacts. More formally estimating a correlation coefficient between 




















Figure 4: Comparison of Sectoral Impacts of Covid-19 and Brexit 
 
Source: Authors calculations of impacts using data from CSO, UN ComTrade and UK Government tariffs. See 
text for details. 
 
In order to use the more detailed sectoral interactions in the next section, we next assign rankings to 
each sector at a slightly finer level of detail. In the main, this is done by giving the same level of exposure 
to each subsector within a broader grouping. There are some exceptions, however, as we use the 
evidence on Brexit export impacts to assign different levels of exposure to different manufacturing 
sectors. Table 5 lists the most severely affected sectors (red ranking) for both of the shocks, Table 6 
lists those more moderately affected and Table 7 lists the unaffected sectors. 
 
Table 3 compares the numbers of sectors in each of the categories and the extent to which they overlap. 
Broadly similar numbers of sectors are assigned to each rank group for the two different shocks with 
21 of the 57 sectors ranked Green (i.e. unaffected) for Brexit and 11 ranked Red (i.e. likely to be severely 
impacted). For the Covid-19 shock, 23 sectors are ranked Green, 18 Amber (i.e. moderately affected) 
and 16 are Red. In terms of overlap, no sector is ranked as Red for both shocks and just 7 are ranked 
as Green for both. If a numerical ranking is applied (where Green is 1, Amber is 2 and Red 3) to generate 
a correlation coefficient, we find a statistically significant negative correlation between the ranking of 
exposure to the two shocks.13 In contrast to the correlation estimated above, this uses only the broad 
exposure and not the severity of the impact. Both correlations are consistent in showing that the shocks 
are not impacting on the same sectors to any substantial degree.  
 
Although the broad pattern of this comparison is that sectors tend to be exposed to either one shock or 
the other, there are a number of sectors at higher risk of being impacted by both which is a cause for 
concern. Four sectors that are severely exposed to Covid-19 are also likely to be affected (albeit more 
 











































moderately) by Brexit: Water transport, Air transport, Publishing, film and broadcasting services and 
Travel agency and tourism service activities. A further five sectors that are severely exposed to Brexit 
have an Amber ranking for exposure to Covid-19: these are mainly in the traditional manufacturing 
group (Textiles, Wearing apparel, Leather, Wood Products and Paper Products).    
 
 
Table 3: Comparison of Sector Rankings  
  Brexit 
  








Green 7 10 6 23 
Amber 2 11 5 18 
Red 12 4 0 16 




While Table 3 suggests limited sectoral overlap between the shocks, it is possible that the most exposed 
sectors for each shock are co-located in certain regions which could be important from a policy response 
perspective. To examine if this might be the case, Table 4 compares employment in each of the 
categories by region and the extent to which they differ between shocks. This is done by calculating the 
numbers employed in the red, amber and green sectors in each region as a share of total employment 
in that region in 2019Q4.  
It is striking that there appears to be little divergence across regions with regard to the impacts of the 
shocks. The share of employment in sectors ranked Red for Brexit ranges from 9 per cent in Dublin to 
14 per cent in Border, South-East and Midland. In contrast, the shares of employment in sectors ranked 
Red for Covid-19 appear to be relatively consistent across regions with a range of 35 per cent in Dublin 
to 41 per cent in Mid-East.14 However, the share of employment taking place in ‘Red’ sectors is 




14 Table A2 in the annex shows recipients of pandemic income support by region. In this case, as a share of total 
regional employment, the number of people receiving pandemic income support is relatively consistent across 
regions, ranging from 41 per cent in West to 45 per cent in Mid-East. At present, it is not possible to examine 




Table 4: Employment Share by Region, % of total regional employment15 
Region Red Amber Green All Sectors  
Brexit     
Border 14 24 62 100 
West 12 28 60 100 
Mid-West 12 27 61 100 
South-East 14 27 59 100 
South-West 11 32 56 100 
Dublin 9 36 55 100 
Mid-East 11 28 61 100 
Midland 14 28 57 100 
     
Covid-19     
Border 39 10 51 100 
West 36 11 54 100 
Mid-West 36 12 52 100 
South-East 38 12 49 100 
South-West 37 13 49 100 
Dublin              35           9          56         100 
Mid-East       41          10          49         100 
Midland              38           11          51         100 






















15 The counties included in each region are: Border – Cavan, Donegal, Leitrim, Monaghan and Sligo; Midland – 
Laois, Longford, Offaly and Westmeath; West – Galway, Mayo and Roscommon; Mid-East- Kildare, Louth, Meath 
and Wicklow; Mid-West – Clare, Limerick and Tipperary; South-East – Carlow, Limerick, Waterford and Wexford; 




Table 5: Severely Affected (“Red”) Sectors  
Brexit Covid-19 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing (1-3) Mining, quarrying and extraction (5-9) 
Manufacture of food products (10) Construction and construction works (41-43) 
Manufacture of beverages and tobacco 
products (11-12) 
Wholesale and retail trade and repair of vehicles (45) 
Manufacture of textiles (13) Wholesale trade (46) 
Manufacture of wearing apparel (14) Retail trade (47) 
Manufacture of leather and related products 
(15) 
Water transport services (50) 
Manufacture of wood and wood products 
(excluding furniture) (16) 
Air transport services (51) 
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper 
products (17) 
Accommodation services (55) 
Financial service activities (64) Food and beverage services (56) 
Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding 
(65) 
Publishing, film and broadcasting services (58-60) 
Other financial activities (66) Real estate activities (68) 
 Travel agency and tourism service activities (79) 
 Cultural, arts and gambling activities (90-92) 
 Recreation and sports activities (93) 
 Repair of consumer goods (95) 























Table 6: Moderately Affected (“Amber”) Sectors  
Brexit Covid-19 
Printing and reproduction of recorded media (18) Manufacture of textiles (13) 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products (20) Manufacture of wearing apparel (14) 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products (22) Manufacture of leather and related products 
(15) 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
(23) 
Manufacture of wood and wood products 
(excluding furniture) (16) 
Manufacture of basic metals (24) Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper 
products (17) 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products (25) Printing and reproduction of recorded media 
(18) 
Manufacture of electrical equipment (27) 
Manufacture of refined petroleum, basic 
pharmaceutical, computer, electronic & 
optical products, machinery and equipment 
n.e.c., furniture, other manufacturing (19, 21, 
26, 28, 31, 32) 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, other transport 
equipment (29-30) 
Manufacture of basic metals (24) 
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 
(33) 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products 
(25) 
Land transport services (49) Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, other 
transport equipment (29-30) 
Water transport services (50) Repair and installation of machinery and 
equipment (33) 
Air transport services (51) Land transport services (49) 
Warehousing (52) Warehousing (52) 
Publishing, film and broadcasting services (58-60) Architectural and engineering services (71) 
Telecommunications services (61) Rental and leasing activities (77) 
Computer programming, consultancy and data 
processing (62-63) 
Employment services (78) 
Legal and accounting activities (69) Security, office and business support 
activities (80-82) 
Head office and management consultancy activities 
(70) 
Membership organisation services (94) 
Architectural and engineering services (71)  
Rental and leasing activities (77)  
Employment services (78)  
Travel agency and tourism service activities (79)  
Security, office and business support activities (80-82)  
Advertising, market research, other professional & 








Table 7: Unaffected (“Green”) Sectors  
Brexit Covid-19 
Mining, quarrying and extraction (5-9) Agriculture, forestry and fishing (1-3) 
Manufacture of refined petroleum, basic 
pharmaceutical, computer, electronic & optical 
products, machinery and equipment n.e.c., furniture, 
other manufacturing (19, 21, 26, 28, 31, 32) 
Manufacture of food products (10) 
Electricity and gas supply (35) Manufacture of beverages and tobacco 
products (11-12) 
Water collection, treatment and supply (36) Manufacture of chemicals and chemical 
products (20) 
Sewerage, waste collection and remediation services 
(37-39) 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
(22) 
Construction and construction works (41-43) Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral 
products (23) 
Wholesale and retail trade and repair of vehicles (45) Manufacture of electrical equipment (27) 
Wholesale trade (46) Electricity and gas supply (35) 
Retail trade (47) Water collection, treatment and supply (36) 
Postal and courier services (53) Sewerage, waste collection and remediation 
services (37-39) 
Accommodation services (55) Postal and courier services (53) 
Food and beverage services (56) Telecommunications services (61) 
Public administration (84) Computer programming, consultancy and 
data processing (62-63) 
Real estate activities (68) Financial service activities (64) 
Education services (85) Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding 
(65) 
Human health and social work activities (86-88) Other financial activities (66) 
Cultural, arts and gambling activities (90-92) Legal and accounting activities (69) 
Recreation and sports activities (93) Head office and management consultancy 
activities (70) 
Membership organisation services (94) Scientific research and development 
services (72) 
Repair of consumer goods (95) Advertising, market research, other 
professional & scientific services (73-75) 
Other personal service activities (96) Public administration (84) 
 Education services (85) 









Section 5: Supply Chain Connections 
The analysis to this point has shown that the sectors most likely to be adversely impacted by Covid-19 
are quite different to those likely to be impacted by Brexit. However, we have implicitly assumed that 
the Brexit and Covid-19 shocks are independent of one another, i.e. that the impact of Covid-19 on 
certain sectors does not affect Brexit impacted sectors and vice versa. The next stage of our analysis 
is to examine the potential linkages between sectors. The analysis here is based on domestic flows of 
inputs and outputs, making use of the CSO’s Input-Output tables from 2015. The analysis takes a similar 
structure to that outlined in McCann and Myers (2020) who examine the transmission of the Covid-19 
shock through domestic supply chains. 
In this section we examine the cross-sectoral flows using several approaches. The first examines the 
flows between sectors to examine the degree to which the vulnerable sectors engage with each other 
to outline any potential supply chain effects. The second examines the magnitude of the flows between 
sectors as a share of their total output. Finally, we examine potential difficulties sectors may have if they 
source a large degree of their inputs from Covid-19 impacted sectors. In order to examine the inter-
sectoral flows, we once again rank each sector across both shocks according to their expected 
vulnerability outlined in the previous sections.  
The data used to examine the supply connections between sectors comes from information contained 
in the CSO’s 2015 Input-Output table of domestic product flows. Input-Output tables describe the sales 
and purchases relationships between producers and consumers within the economy. In particular, we 
are interested in the flow of goods and services between sectors. A firm or sector purchases inputs from 
other firms or sectors and then uses those inputs to produce outputs. The firm or sector then sells their 
output to other sectors/firms for use as inputs in the production process. Once the final outputs are 
produced sectors/firms then supply sectors such as households, business, government, and exports 
with final output. In terms of our analysis, we focus on the flow of goods between sectors only and 
analyse the linkages through the domestic supply chain to examine the potential inter sectoral impact 
of Covid-19 and Brexit in Ireland. We first do this separately and then by looking at the sectoral linkages 
across the shocks in order to understand the degree to which domestic supply chains could be affected 
by both shocks.  
The linkages between sectors are presented in value terms (millions of euro) in Table 8a with the 
corresponding percentages of total inter-sector flows in Table 8b. In the top-left panel, we see the 
sectors ranked by their exposure to the Brexit shock and how they interact with one another. In this, we 
see that severely affected Brexit sectors supplied close to €16bn to other severely affected sectors 
(labelled Red-Red in our matrix) which accounts for 17 per cent of total sector-to-sector transactions. 
The more moderately affected (Amber) Brexit sectors supplied €21bn to other moderately affected 
sectors (23 per cent of the total). In total, sales from sectors severely impacted by Brexit account for 24 
per cent of purchases, with sales from moderately impacted sectors accounting for 45 per cent and 
unaffected sectors the origin of the remaining 31 per cent. If we look at it from the purchaser side, the 




These flows represent the inter-industry flows between sectors which only represent a share of total 
sectoral output, i.e. where total output is equal to the sum of inter-industry flows and total final uses with 
final uses being the sum of household and government consumption, investment and exports. 
Therefore, these sector-to-sector flows are relatively small compared to total outputs. For example, the 
total output of severely affected, moderately affected and unaffected Brexit sectors in 2015 were €76bn, 
€182bn and €263bn respectively.  
Table 8a: Economic Activity Between Sectors, € millions 
      Sectors, purchasing inputs 
 
      Brexit     Covid-19 
 




















t Green 2,613 7,234 18,082 27929 
 8,891 5,083 13,955 27929 
Amber 5,651 20,746 14,052 40449   11,418 6,424 22,607 40449 
Red 15,677 2,080 3,796 21553   2,726 1,407 17,420 21553 
  Column 
total 23941  30060  35930  89931 
 23035  12914  53983  89931 






9 Green 20,558 18,259 17,262 56079   10,048 4,834 41,197 56079 
Amber 1,725 5,859 7,620 15204   5,272 4,334 5,598 15204 
Red 1,657 5,943 11,048 18648   7,714 3,745 7,188 18648    
Column 
total 23941  30060  35930  89931 
  23035  12914  53983  89931 
Source: Authors calculations based on CSO 2015 Input-Output Tables 
 
 
Table 8b: Economic Activity Between Sectors, percentage of inter-sector flows (from Table 8a) 
      Sectors, purchasing inputs 
      Brexit   Covid-19 























t Green 3%  8%  20%  31% 
 
10%  6%  16%  31% 
Amber 6%  23%  16%  45% 
 
13%  7%  25%  45% 
Red 17%  2%  4%  24% 
 
3%  2%  19%  24% 
  Column 
total 
27%  33%  40%  100% 
 
26%  14%  60%  100% 






9 Green 23%  20%  19%  62% 
 
11%  5%  46%  62% 
Amber 2%  7%  8%  17% 
 
6%  5%  6%  17% 
Red 2%  7%  12%  21% 
 
9%  4%  8%  21%    
Column 
total 
27%  33%  40%  100% 
 
26%  14%  60%  100% 
Source: Authors calculations based on CSO 2015 Input-Output Tables 
 
The bottom-right quadrant of Tables 8a and 8b show the sector-to-sector sales of sectors ranked by 
their exposure to the Covid-19 shock. Here we find that €23bn (26 per cent) was purchased by severely 




Severely affected Covid-19 sectors supplied close to €8bn to other severely affected sectors while 
moderately affected Covid-19 sectors supplied €4bn to other moderately affected sectors. In contrast, 
there are €54bn of sales to unaffected sectors representing 60 per cent of the total. Once again, it 
should be noted that these total sector-to-sector sales represent only a small portion of total sector 
output. Total outputs of the severely affected, moderately affected and unaffected sectors in relation to 
Covid-19 were €122bn, €158bn and €242bn respectively in 2015. 
We now move on to examine the potential supply chain overlap between the sectors impacted by Covid-
19 and those likely to be impacted by Brexit. To examine the potential linkages, we first examine the 
Covid-19 sectors that sell their output to Brexit sectors (bottom-left quadrant of Tables 8a and 8b).  We 
estimate sector-to-sector sales of €15bn from sectors that are severely or moderately affected by Covid-
19 to sectors that are severely or moderately affected by Brexit (total of the Red-Red, Red-Amber, 
Amber-Red and Amber-Amber flows). This represents 17 per cent of total inter-sector transactions. Of 
this only €1.7bn (2 per cent) of sector to sector sales occur in ‘severely affected to severely affected 
sectors’. Where this is the case, the severely affected Covid-19 sectors with the largest sales to severely 
affected Brexit sectors are Wholesale Trade (€439m), Construction (€262m) and Publishing, Film and 
Broadcasting Activities (€238m).  
There is also €5.9bn (7 per cent) of sales from severely affected Covid-19 sectors to moderately 
affected Brexit sectors. In this case the largest Covid-19 severely affected sectors include Real Estate 
Activities (€1.1bn), Wholesale Trade (€1.1bn) and Publishing, Film and Broadcasting Services (€943m). 
In terms of the moderately affected Covid-19 sectors selling to moderately affected Brexit sectors there 
are sales at a similar level of €5.9bn. The largest selling sectors in this case include Security, office and 
business support activities (€1.2bn), Warehousing (€1.1bn), Architectural and engineering services 
(€748m) and Land Transport Services (€577).  
Perhaps the most striking finding is that of the sales from sectors likely to be unaffected from Covid-19 
which total €56bn, the majority goes to sectors that are severely or moderately affected by Brexit. Of 
this, almost €21bn (23 per cent total sales) goes to sectors severely affected by Brexit. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the sectors unaffected by Covid-19 with the largest sales to severely affected Brexit 
sectors include Agriculture (€5bn), Other Financial Activities (€3.4bn), Financial Service Activities 
(€2.9bn), Insurance, Reinsurance and Pension Funding (€2.3bn), Computer Programming, 
Consultancy and Data Processing (€1.7bn) and Manufacture of Food (€1.4bn).  
Looking at the final quadrant of sales from Brexit exposed sectors to Covid-19 sectors (top-right 
quadrant), we find that €2.7bn (3 per cent) of sector to sector sales occur between severely affected 
Brexit to severely affected Covid-19 sectors. In this case, the severely-affected Brexit sectors with the 
largest sales to severely-affected Covid-19 sectors is Financial Service Activities (€1.6bn). There is 
€6.4bn (7 per cent) of sales from moderately affected Brexit to moderately affected Covid-19 sectors. 
In this case the largest Brexit moderately affected sectors include Warehousing (€699m), Legal and 
accounting activities (€672), computer programming, consultancy and data processing (€565) and 
publishing, film and broadcasting services (€553). We again find that severely affected Brexit sectors 
have sales of €17bn to unaffected Covid-19 sectors suggesting that though there is some supply chain 
overlap between the two shocks, in the most part the sectors most impacted by the individual shocks 




buyers in relatively unexposed purchasing from suppliers in sectors that are severely impacted by either 
shock are quite significant. This could result in the transmission of the shocks to the less directly 
exposed sectors either through prices or supply restrictions.  
Looking at the detailed sectoral level, we can see which sectors have the most exposure to vulnerable 
Brexit (Red or Amber) buying sectors. These results are presented in Table 9 for Brexit buying sectors. 
The Computer Programming sector has the largest overall exposure to vulnerable Brexit buying sectors 
of €9.4bn although this represents only 16 per cent of the sectors overall output. It is interesting to note 
that the nine of the top eleven sectors with the largest sales to vulnerable Brexit sectors are all sectors 
which are relatively unaffected by Covid-19.  
 












    
Computer programming, consultancy and data processing Green 9,433 16 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing Green 5,470 65 
Other Financial activities Green 4,207 63 
Financial service activities Green 3,667 17 
Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding Green 2,552 18 
Legal and accounting activities Green 2,536 47% 
Security, Office and Business Support Activities Amber 1,672 50 
Head Office and Management Consultancy Activities Green 1,512 37 
Wholesale Trade Red 1,493 4 
Advertising, market research and other professional & 
scientific activities 
Green 1,489 4 
Manufacture of Food Products Green 1,461 7 
Source: Authors estimates based on CSO data 
Table 10 presents the sectors which have most exposure to vulnerable Covid-19 (Red or Amber) buying 
sectors. The Construction sector has the largest overall exposure to vulnerable Covid-19 buying sectors 
of €4.5bn although this represents only 26 per cent of the sectors overall output. However, the majority 
of this represents sales to other firms in the Construction sector. It is also worth noting that 10 per cent 
of the output from financial services activities, a sector likely to be severely impacted by Brexit, is sold 







Table 10: Largest Sector by annual sales to firms in vulnerable Covid-19 buying sector 
Producer Sector Brexit Status 
Annual Flows, 
€m 




Construction and construction 
works 
Green 4,548 26 
Real estate activities Green 2,124 11 
Financial service activities Red 2,095 10 
Legal and accounting activities Amber 1,831 34 
Computer programming, 
consultancy and data processing 
Amber 1,784 3 
Warehousing Amber 1,641 71 
Security, office and business 
support activities 
Amber 1,578 47 
Electricity and gas supply Green 1,520 24 
Advertising, market research, other 
professional & scientific services 
Amber 1,505 17 
Head office and management 
consultancy activities 
Amber 1,381 34 
    
Source: Authors estimates based on CSO data 
 
 
The next two tables present the highest shares of sales in sectoral total output to the most affected 
Brexit (Table 11) and Covid-19 buying sectors (Table 12). The sectors most exposed to vulnerable 
Brexit sectors are Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (65 per cent) and Warehousing (50 per cent). The 
sectors most exposed to vulnerable Covid-19 sectors are Warehousing (71 per cent) and Repair and 












Table 11: Sectors with largest % of total output going in sector-to-sector flows to vulnerable 




% Share of producer 
sector’s total output 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing Green 65 
Other Financial Activities Green 63 
Repair of Consumer Goods Red 63 
Warehousing Amber 52 
Security, office and business support activities Amber 50 
Employment Services Amber 49 
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment Amber 49 
Legal and Accounting Services Green 47 
Head Office and Management Consultancy Services Green 37 
Architectural and Engineering Services Amber 36 
Postal and courier services Green 35 
Source: Authors estimates based on CSO data 
 
Table 12: Sectors with largest % of total output going in sector-to-sector flows to vulnerable 




% Share of producer 
sector’s total output 
Warehousing Amber 71 
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment Amber 62 
Employment services Amber 52 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products Amber 50 
Security, office and business support activities Amber 47 
Manufacture of wood and wood products (excluding 
furniture) 
Red 44 
Architectural and engineering services Amber 41 
Head office and management consultancy activities Amber 34 
Legal and accounting activities Amber 34 
Water transport services Amber 33 
Source: Authors estimates based on CSO data 
 
However, the vulnerability of certain sectors could also be related to strong links to certain individual 
sectors. Figure 5 presents the sectors (and their associated Covid-19 ranking) who sell more than 5 per 
cent of their output to a particular severely or moderately affected Brexit sector. In this case, there are 
sales from unaffected, severely and moderately affected Covid sectors which sell more than 5 per cent 
of their output to severely or moderately affected Brexit sectors. As presented below, the largest flow 
of output from one sector to another is from agriculture, forestry and fishing which sells nearly 40 per 
cent of its output to manufacture of food products sector. Also of note is that the Computer programming, 
consultancy and data processing sector and the financial services activities sectors buys a significant 




















































Source: Authors estimates based on CSO data. 
Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishing 
Mining, quarrying and extraction 
Repair and installation of 
machinery and equipment 
Wholesale and retail trade 
and repair of vehicles 
Warehousing 
Telecommunications services 
Postal and courier services 
Other financial activities 
Legal and accounting activities 
Architectural and 
engineering services 
Travel agency and 
tourism service activities 
Employment services 
Security, office and 
business support 
activities 
Cultural, arts and 
gambling activities 






Manufacture of Pulp, Paper and 
Paper Products 
Computer programming, 










Advertising and market 
research, other professional and 
scientific services 
Publishing, film and 
broadcasting services 
Rental and leasing activities 






Another way to examine the potential supply chain linkages between Covid-19 and Brexit is to examine 
the reliance on sectors affected by Covid-19 for inputs in the production process. Figure A3 in the annex 
presents the buyers (and their associated Brexit ranking) who purchase more than 5 per cent of their 
inputs from individual sectors (and their associated Covid-19 ranking). In comparison to the output 
analysis presented in Figure 4, the input links appear to much less pronounced implying that sectors 
are less reliant on other sectors for use as inputs in the production process when presented as a share 
of total sectoral inputs.  
 
Section 6: Conclusion 
Along with the rest of the world, Ireland has been experiencing the greatest public health crisis in living 
memory.  The measures to limit the spread of Covid-19 have severely impacted social and economic 
activity. Prior to the onset of the pandemic, the Irish economy was performing strongly with the main 
source of exogenous risk being a concern that trade negotiations between the EU and UK would not 
reach agreement by the end of the year. While the potential economic impacts of Brexit without a trade 
deal have been substantially overshadowed by the Covid-19 crisis, it opens up the possibility that 
layering a hard Brexit on an economy weakened by dealing with Covid-19 could make the previously 
estimated effects of Brexit worse. The interrelationship of the two shocks is therefore an important 
consideration for the near-term economic prospects. The direction of the relationship is not obvious ex 
ante as to whether the two shocks might exacerbate each other or if the impact of Brexit be less if 
economic activity has already shifted to a lower base.  
 
This paper attempts to give some insight into this question by examining the sectoral exposure to both 
shocks. This broadly follows work on the UK by De Lyon and Dhingra (2020a, 2020b) who found very 
little overlap between the sectors exposed to Covid-19 and those exposed to Brexit. We then expand 
on this by also examining interlinkages between the exposed sectors to each shock in terms of supply 
chains to those exposed to the other shock. This allows us to not just examine each shock separately 
but to also get a sense of possible “knock-on” effects from a reduction in activity in one sector to other 
areas of the economy.  
 
Overall, we find that there is limited overlap in the sectors exposed to the different shocks. We assign 
a rank to each sector for each shock, using three categories: severely affected sectors (“Red”), 
moderately affected sectors (“Amber”) and unaffected sectors (“Green”). We rank the sectors most 
exposed to the Covid-19 shock using data on the number of people receiving either the PUP or TWSS. 
The sectors worst affected were Wholesale and Retail Trade, Accommodation and Food Services, 
Construction and Industry. Using estimates based on modelling trade barriers in goods and services, 
we find that these sectors are fairly limited in terms of their exposure to Brexit. No sector was found to 
be in a category of severely exposed to both the Brexit and Covid-19 shocks. That said, a number of 
sectors did fall into the category of being severely exposed to one shock and moderately exposed to 
the other, a combination that leaves them at particular risk if the two shocks are combined. The most 
exposed sector to the Brexit shock, financial services and insurance, is in the mid-range of the Covid-




(out of 57) sectors are found to be unaffected by either shock. We should also note that the ranking of 
shock impact that we undertake is at a sector level and impacts on individual firms may of course 
deviate from this.  
 
The initial comparison of sector exposure does not take into account linkages between sectors. We 
therefore examine the flow of goods and services between sectors affected by the two shocks to 
establish the extent of potential supply chain transmission of the shocks. Our main finding is that the 
sectors exposed to each shock are not particularly closely connected to those affected by the other 
shock. This comes from the observation that sectors that are severely affected by Covid-19 typically 
sell a greater share of their output for use as inputs in the production process to sectors that are likely 
to be relatively unaffected by Brexit. A similar pattern is found for sectors exposed to Brexit not being 
strongly linked to those affected by Covid-19. Overall, these findings suggest that adding the Brexit 
shock to that of Covid-19 brings a wider range of sectors exposed to risk but that the impacts are not 
magnified by interaction effects. There may however be other mechanisms at play, particularly in terms 
of heightened uncertainty regarding the aggregate economic outlook that impact across all sectors in 
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Figure A1: Numbers Claiming PUP over time by selected sector, to week ending 
 
Source: Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection 
 




































































(1+2) as % of 
All 
Recipients  
(1+2) as % of 
Employment 
in this Sector 
Wholesale and Retail 
Trade 
75 105 181 18 58 
Accommodation and 
Food Services 
121 32 154 15 86 
Construction 52 40 92 9 62 




34 27 61 6 54 
Professional, Scientific 
and Technical Activities 
17 37 54 5 39 
Arts, Entertainment 
and Other Services 
34 18 51 5 43 
Transportation and 
Storage 
13 30 44 4 40 
Human Health and 
Social Work Activities 
18 25 43 4 15 
Financial Insurance 
and Real Estate 
Activities 
13 16 29 3 25 
Education 16 10 27 3 14 
Information and 
Communication 





7 0.4 7 1 6 
Agriculture 4 3 7 1 7 













Table A2: Recipients of Pandemic Income Support by Region as of 1st Week May 2020, ‘000s 











(1+2) as % of 
All Recipients  
(1+2) as % of 
Employment in 
this Region 
Border 53 28 80 8 44 
West 56 35 91 9 41 
Mid-West 56 36 92 9 43 
South-East 53 33 87 8 44 
South-West 85 56 140 14 42 
Dublin 175 136 311 30 43 
Mid-East 88 68 156 15 45 
Midlands 34 24 58 6 43 
Region not included   2 9 11 1  
Total 602 425 1,027 100 44 
Source: DEASP, CSO 
Note: Figures may not sum due to rounding. The regional employment data is sourced from the CSO’s Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) data for 2019Q4. The PUP is measured as 18-66 while the LFS employment data is 15+ so 
shares presented are not exact but are approximate. We use the PUP sectoral breakdown from DEASP. For the 
TWSS in the week up to 3rd May approximately 8,880 people were not assigned to a region while for the PUP 2,000 































A. Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 01-03 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
B. Mining and Quarrying 05-09 
Industry 
C. Manufacturing 10-33 
D. Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air 
Conditioning Supply 
35 
E. Water Supply, Sewerage, Waste 
Management and Remediation 
Services 
36-39 
F. Construction 41-43 
Construction 
G. Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair 
of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 
45-47 
Distribution, Transport, Hotels and 
Restaurants H. Transportation and Storage 
49-53 
I. Accommodation and Food Service 
Activities 
55-56 
J. Information and Communication 
58-63 Information and Communication 
K. Financial and Insurance Activities 64-66 
Financial and Insurance Activities 
L. Real Estate Activities 68 
Real Estate Activities 
M. Professional, Scientific and 
Technical Activities 
69-75 
Professional, Admin and Support 
Services 
N. Administrative and Support 
Service Activities 
77-82 
O. Public Administration and 
Defence; Compulsory Social 
Security 
84 
Public Admin, Education and 
Health 
P. Education 85 
Q. Human Health and Social Work 
Activities 
86-88 
R. Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 
90-93  
Arts, Entertainment, recreation and 
other service activities 
 
 
S. Other Service Activities 94-96 
T. Activities of Households as 
Employers; Undifferentiated Goods 
– and services – producing 
activities of households for own 
97-98 
U. Activities of Extra Territorial 
Organisations and Bodies 





Figure A3: Brexit Sectors that purchase more than 5% of total input from another specific 




















































Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing 
Land Transport Services 






Legal and accounting activities 
Real Estate Activities 
Computer Programming, 


















Postal and Courier 
Services 















Publishing, Film and 
Broadcasting services 
Recreation and Sporting 
Activities 
Repair of Consumer Goods
Other Personal Service Activities
